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How Strong Is the Link Between Internal 
Finance and Small Firm Growth?  
Evidence from the Survey of Small  
Business Finances 
George W. Haynes1 
Montana State University at Bozeman 
 
James R. Brown 
Iowa State University 
While a vast literature exists examining the link between firm investment and cash flow, 
few studies have examined the link between firm growth and internal funds, and those 
that exist have focused exclusively on publicly traded firms. This study posits that inter-
nal funds are critically important to small firm growth. While other studies have utilized 
Compustat and other databases containing responses from publicly traded firms, this 
study utilizes the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Small Business Finances, a database 
containing responses from non-publicly traded firms with fewer than 500 employees. We 
show that small growth firms are more likely than non-growth firms to have lines of 
credit, motor vehicle loans, capital leases, equipment loans, and loans from both com-
mercial banks and finance companies. We find a strong, positive relationship between 
internal funds and employment growth across small, private firms. In addition, we find 
that the relationship between internal funds and employment growth is especially impor-
tant for very small and women-owned firms. These results highlight the importance of 
programs that effectively reduce the costs of borrowing and increase net profits in foster-
                                                 
1 Research performed under contract number SBAHQ-07-M-0381. The statements, findings, conclusions, 
and recommendations are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Ad-
vocacy, the U.S. Small Business Administration, or the U.S. government. 
Internal Finance and Small Firm Growth 69 Haynes and Brown 
ing the growth of small businesses, especially for very small and women-owned firms. 
For the practitioner working with small businesses, this study suggests that while outside 
capital is often needed, internal capital is critically important for the growth of small 
businesses. 
1. Introduction 
Compared to the vast literature that examines the link between firm investment and the 
availability of internal funds, few studies examine the link between finance and firm 
growth, and those that do focus exclusively on publicly traded firms (e.g., Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002). In this study we provide new evidence on the financing of small, private 
growth firms using data from the Federal Reserve Board’s 1993 and 2003 Surveys of 
Small Business Finances (SSBF). We show that small growth firms are more likely than 
non-growth firms to have lines of credit, motor vehicle loans, capital leases, equipment 
loans, and loans from both commercial banks and finance companies. We also find a 
strong positive relation between the level of internal funds and the likelihood that small 
firms report positive employment growth. Though exploratory in nature, our results are 
consistent with a model of firm growth in which firm expansion is constrained by the 
availability of internal and external funds. 
Our study has several important implications. First, our results suggest that the 
strong link between finance and real firm behavior documented extensively for publicly 
traded firms also holds for smaller firms with limited access to public equity markets. In 
particular, small growth firms are more likely to rely on key external sources for credit 
(e.g., commercial banks and finance companies), and hence the impact of improved (or 
reduced) access to such sources could be expected to have the greatest impact on small 
growth firms. Second, the very strong relation between internal finance and the likelihood 
that small firms report positive growth suggests that small firms in the United States may 
face economically important financing frictions. Data limitations temper the conclusions 
we can confidently draw from this finding, but our findings at least suggest that financing 
constraints may be particularly important for the growth of very small firms (those with 
fewer than 20 employees and less than $1 million in sales) and firms with women-
owners. This finding highlights two key firm characteristics that public policy efforts to 
address small firms’ financing difficulties might emphasize. 
In the next section provides a brief survey of the literature on financing con-
straints and small firms. In section three we discuss the growth of firms in a model with 
binding financing frictions. In section four we discuss our data source and empirical 
strategy, and we present the sample summary statistics. Section five contains finance-
growth regressions, and section six concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature Review 
The literature discusses several reasons why small growth firms might face a high cost of 
external capital. First, asymmetric information problems may be especially severe for 
smaller firms, which can lead to both adverse selection and moral hazard,2 and poten-
tially even to credit rationing (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In addition, smaller ven-
tures may have difficulty obtaining debt finance because their returns are uncertain and 
highly volatile, and creditors do not share in firms’ returns in the good states (Stiglitz, 
1985). Smaller firms also may possess limited collateral which is often necessary for ob-
taining debt financing, particularly for risky firms (Berger and Udell, 1990). Finally, ex-
ternal equity financing is likely even more expensive than debt for almost all small firms, 
due to both high floatation costs associated with public issues (Lee, Lockhead, Ritter and 
Zhao, 1996), and the “lemons premium” that any potential equity supplier may demand 
due to asymmetric information problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
                                                
Several recent studies present evidence suggesting that financing constraints are 
important for small firm investment and growth. In the paper most closely related to our 
study, Carpenter and Petersen (2002) find strong evidence that the growth of small, pub-
licly traded firms in the United States is constrained by internal funds. Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989) show that “most individuals who enter self-employment face a binding 
liquidity constraint and as a result use a suboptimal amount of capital to start up their 
businesses” (p. 810). Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994a) find evidence suggesting 
that liquidity constraints impact entrepreneurial success and growth.3 Hennessy and 
Whited (2007) present a structural model indicating that equity floatation costs are high 
for small firms. Tsoukalas (2006) presents evidence suggesting that the inventory invest-
ment of small firms is constrained by internal funds.4 Finally, Hadlock and Pierce (2008) 
compare a large number of proxies for the likelihood that firms face financing frictions 
and conclude that firm size and age are very strong predictors of a firm’s financial con-
straint status.5 
Recent work utilizing the SSBF found that African-American business owners 
may face discrimination in the market for financial credit. Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo and 
Wolken (2002) found that, after controlling for business characteristics, substantial dif-
ferences in denial rates between firms owned by African Americans and white males still 
existed. These results have been supported by more complex econometric work com-
pleted by Blanchflower, Levine and Zimmerman (2003) who found that black-owned 
 
2 Defined as the lack of incentive to guard against a risk when you are protected against it (as by insurance). 
3 Also see Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994b). 
4 A comprehensive survey of the large literature on financing constraints for physical investment is pro-
vided by Hubbard (1998). 
5 We note that some recent studies conclude small firm access to credit may have improved in recent years, 
including Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Vos, Yeh, Carter, and Tagg (2007). 
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small businesses are about twice as likely to be denied credit, even after controlling for 
differences in creditworthiness and other factors. 
And finally, a comparison of the earlier editions of the SSBF with the most recent 
2003 SSBF by Mach and Wolken (2006) suggests that non-depository institutions have 
become more important to small business owners, although commercial banks have re-
mained the dominant supplier of most financial services. 
3. Theoretical Framework:  
A Model of Finance Constrained Growth 
The discussion above suggests that small firms may face a financial pecking-order when 
financing their growth, wherein they first exhaust internal funds before turning to debt, 
and then perhaps to external equity, if demand for funds is sufficiently high (Myers, 
1984). Alternative theories of capital structure include the trade-off theory, which focuses 
on the choice of a debt level that balances the tax benefits of debt with the costs of finan-
cial distress, and the market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002), which argues that 
the timing of stock issues to correspond to high stock prices will have a persistent impact 
on firm capital structure. Almost all studies that attempt to evaluate these theories of 
capital structure focus on publicly traded firms, and, obviously, the market timing theory 
is only relevant for such firms. There appears to be no consensus from this literature on 
which theory best rationalizes the observed capital structure of public firms (Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999; Frank and Goyal, 2003; and Fama and French, 2002 and 2005). 
More importantly for our purposes, however, a recent study by Cole (2008) shows that 
the capital structure of small, private firms is consistent with the predictions of the peck-
ing-order theory. 
A financing hierarchy based on these ideas is illustrated below. The model is 
taken directly from Carpenter and Petersen (2002) and Hubbard (1998). The change in 
firm size and quantity of finance are measured on the horizontal axis, and the marginal 
cost of funds and marginal revenue product (MRP) of expansion are measured on the ver-
tical axis. The quantity of available internal finance is IF, and the marginal opportunity 
cost of internal finance is MCIF. The firm exhausts internal finance first, and then, if the 
marginal returns from expansion are high enough, turns to debt (the upward sloping por-
tion of the supply curve). To see that such a firm is “constrained” at the margin, note that 
an increase in available internal funds from IF0 to IF1 shifts the entire supply schedule out 
and leads to an increase in the firm’s rate of growth from G0 to G1. Note as well that as 
financing constraints are relaxed the upward sloping portion of the supply of funds 
schedule becomes more elastic (closer to a supply of funds schedule consistent with per-
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fect capital markets) and the sensitivity of firm growth to the availability of internal funds 
declines. 
 
Figure 1. Financing Hierarchy Model 
MC of Funds, 
MRP of expansion 
MCIF 
Growth Rate, 
Quantity of Funds 
Supply of Funds 
MRP of 
expansion 
IF0 G0  G1IF1 
Data, Estimation Strategy, and Summary Statistics 
We construct the sample from the 1993 and 2003 SSBFs. The SSBF is a cross-
sectional survey of small, private firms in the United States designed to generate repre-
sentative samples of economy-wide small firm activity. We exclude firms in the follow-
ing industries from the sample: utilities (two-digit SIC code 49); finance, insurance and 
real estate (two-digit SIC code 60-69); and public administration and unclassified (two-
digit SIC code of 91 or greater). We also exclude the relatively few firms that report be-
ing publicly traded (32 firms in the 1993 sample and 9 firms in 2003 sample). 
The SSBF in both 1993 and 2003 asks firms whether employment growth over 
the past three years has been positive, unchanged, or negative. We consider all firms that 
report positive employment growth to be “growth” firms and all other firms to be “non-
growth” firms. Given this measure of firm growth, firms that have not been in business 
for three years are necessarily excluded from the sample. The primary measure of internal 
finance we use is the natural log of firm profits (plus one). Because a sizeable number of 
firms report negative profits, we “scale up” reported profits in each sample year by add-
ing the minimum profits value reported that year to all reported profit values. Obviously, 
Internal Finance and Small Firm Growth 73 Haynes and Brown 
Internal Finance and Small Firm Growth 74 Haynes and Brown 
profits is an imperfect measure of internal funds, so in Appendix A we report results with 
the log level of internal equity (total assets minus total liabilities) used in place of profits. 
The final sample consists of 3,905 firms from the 1993 survey and 3,447 firms from the 
2003 survey, or 7,352 total firm-year observations. For all the descriptive statistics and 
regression results reported in the paper, we apply the appropriate sampling weights as 
provided in the 1993 and 2003 SSBFs. The 2003 SSBF contains five separate data impli-
cates and we use the first implicate. 
4. Empirical Strategy 
We begin by considering whether growth and non-growth firms differ in the type and 
sources of external credit they obtain. To evaluate how financing sources are associated 
with growth and non-growth firms after controlling for various firm and owner character-
istics, we estimate logistic regressions of the following form: 
 
Pr(Credit_Type)i = PositiveGrowthi + FirmCharacteristics + 
OwnerCharacteristics + t + i. 
We estimate separate regressions for major types and sources of credit, so 
Credit_Type is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a particular type of credit 
(e.g., a capital lease) or obtains credit from a particular source (e.g., a finance company). 
PositiveGrowthi is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm reports positive employment 
growth over the prior three years. The vector of firm characteristics includes age, sales 
and industry; while the owner characteristics include age, education, experience, race 
(minority dummy variable), gender (women dummy variable), and a dummy variable 
equal to one if the owner recently filed for bankruptcy. 
Our second, more exploratory interest is the link between internal finance and 
growth across firms. Empirically, the model developed in the previous section suggests a 
baseline specification like the following: 
PositiveGrowth i = Internal Fundsi + j + t + i. 
Given data availability in the SSBF, we define PositiveGrowthi as a dummy vari-
able equal to one if firm j reports positive employment growth over the previous three 
years and, as noted above, we proxy for Internal Funds with the log of firm profits.6 j is 
an industry-specific fixed effect, t is a year-specific fixed effect, and is a random dis-
turbance. 
Similar specifications have been used to draw inferences about the importance of 
financing frictions for small firm growth among samples of publicly traded firms (e.g., 
Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). One concern with using this regression to draw strong 
conclusions about financing constraints among small firms in the SSBF is that internal 
funds are measured at the end of the survey year (1993 or 2003), while firm growth is 
measured over the prior three years. Consequently, it is difficult to determine the direc-
tion of causality between internal funds and growth: Do small firms grow faster because 
they have more internal funds, or do they have more internal funds because of their fast 
growth? While the available data limits our ability to conclusively deal with this issue, 
we do note that if the regression is merely capturing the fact that high growth firms end 
the period with greater profits, then we should find similar correlations between internal 
funds and growth for all groups of firms, irrespective of the a priori likelihood that they 
face financing frictions. 
A related concern is that internal funds and firm growth may be positively related 
for reasons other than financing constraints. In particular, internal funds are likely to be 
positively correlated with firm growth opportunities across firms, so if the regression 
does not adequately control for growth opportunities we may find a positive internal fi-
nance-growth link even for firms that face no financing constraints. Though the industry 
and year dummies in the baseline specification will capture all growth opportunities at 
the industry and year level, we take two additional steps to address this concern. First, we 
add additional controls for growth opportunities to the baseline specification. In some 
specifications we include the log of firm age, the log of new credit obtained, the log of 
new equity acquired, and, in a particularly strong test of robustness, a dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm reports positive sales growth over the previous three years. Sales 
growth is widely used to control for growth opportunities and, not surprisingly, it is 
strongly correlated with both employment growth and internal funds at the firm level. 
Though still speculative, the inferences we can draw about the importance of internal 
funds for small firm growth are much stronger if we continue to find a positive link be-
tween internal funds and employment growth after including sales growth in the regres-
sion. Second, we estimate the growth regression separately for groups of firms that are a 
priori more or less likely to face binding financing constraints. This approach has been 
used in the financing constraint literature since Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). If 
the regression results reveal information about financing frictions, then firms which are a 
priori more likely to face binding constraints should exhibit a stronger link between in-
                                                 
6 Of course, firm profits is not a perfect proxy for the availability of internal funds, but we know of no per-
fect proxy provided in the SSBF. Furthermore, profits will be a sufficient proxy for internal funds in this 
framework as long as it is highly correlated with the “true” measure, which we expect it to be. 
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ternal funds and growth, whereas the link between internal funds and growth should be 
similar across groups if profits simply proxy for growth opportunities, or if growth firms 
systematically have higher profits at the end of the sample period. The primary split we 
use is based on firm size, which has been widely used as a proxy for the degree of financ-
ing frictions (e.g., Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 
2004). 
Summary Statistics 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 describe the key features of our data. Table 1 reports mean and 
median values for the key regression variables. Several interesting facts emerge from Ta-
ble 1. First, note that Table 1 shows substantial variation in firm size across the firms 
covered by the SSBF. In particular, the firms we classify as “smaller” are significantly 
smaller in terms of both employees and sales than the firms we classify as “larger.” Sec-
ond, the median firm in the pooled sample is thirteen years old and is thus not a new 
start-up enterprise (recall that firms younger than four years old are dropped from the 
sample). Perhaps not surprisingly, smaller firms are slightly younger than larger firms at 
both the mean and the median. Third, positive employment growth for firms in the SSBF 
database is the exception rather than the norm: 28 percent of firms in the pooled sample 
report positive employment growth over the prior three years; a larger fraction of firms in 
the 1993 sample report positive growth than in the 2003 sample. Fourth, note that larger 
firms are more likely to report positive employment growth. Finally, both small and large 
firms are more likely to report positive sales growth than they are to report positive em-
ployment growth. 
Table 2 provides detailed evidence on average employment growth by firm age, 
size, and industry. First, note that employment growth over the previous three years is 
clearly increasing with both with the current level of employees (this is true in both 1993 
and 2003) and the current level of sales. Second, employment growth is more likely for 
younger firms, consistent with the large empirical literature that has studied firm growth 
over the life cycle. Third, employment growth is similar across industries; in both 1993 
and 2003 growth was highest in transportation. Finally, services and retail trade account 
for the largest share of firms in our data. 
Table 3 reports characteristics of “growth” and “non-growth” firms. Growth firms 
tend to be larger and older than non-growth firms, and they have higher profits. In addi-
tion, growth firms obtain, on average, more total credit, more commercial bank credit, 
and more finance company credit. Furthermore, a significantly larger fraction of growth 
firms have lines of credit, motor vehicle loans, capital leases, and equipment loans. A lar-
ger fraction of growth firms also have loans from commercial banks, savings and loans, 
finance companies, and leasing companies. Overall, this table shows that external credit 
is particularly important for the small private firms that are expanding. 
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5. Regression Results 
Financing Characteristics and Small Firm Growth 
While growth firms are, on average, more reliant on external credit than non-
growth firms, they differ in other important ways (e.g., size and age) that might explain 
the differences we observe in Table 3. So, in Table 4 we explore whether the relation be-
tween reporting positive growth and relying on external credit persists after controlling 
for other key firm and owner characteristics. For different types and sources of credit, we 
estimate the logistic regression discussed above and report the coefficient estimate on the 
“PositiveGrowth” dummy variable in Table 4. 
The findings in Table 4 show that growth firms are significantly more likely to 
use some sources of external credit than non-growth firms, after controlling for firm and 
owner characteristics. In particular, we find that firm growth is positively related to hav-
ing a line of credit, a motor vehicle loan, a capital lease, an equipment loan, a loan from a 
commercial bank, and a loan from a finance company. We find no significant differences 
between growth and non-growth firms in the likelihood that they have a mortgage loan, a 
loan from a savings and loan institution, a loan from a credit union, credit from a broker-
age or mutual fund, credit from a leasing company, or credit from an insurance or mort-
gage company. These findings suggest that firm growth is a potentially important charac-
teristic for understanding the use of external credit by small firms. 
The Internal Finance-Growth Relation: Baseline Estimates 
Table 5 reports estimates of the internal finance-growth regression discussed 
above. Column one includes only the level of internal funds (log of profits) and industry 
and year dummies as dependent variables and shows a strong positive link between inter-
nal funds and the likelihood of employment growth across small firms. In column two, 
we add firm age to control for the widely documented fact that firm growth rates (and 
growth opportunities) are a function of firm age (Sutton, 1997). The estimated coefficient 
on age is negative and highly significant, showing that older firms are less likely to ex-
hibit positive employment growth, and the coefficient on internal funds remains positive 
and significant. 
In column three, we add a dummy variable indicating whether the firm reports 
positive sales growth over the prior three years. As discussed above, sales growth is 
widely employed as a control for firm growth opportunities and should be positively cor-
related with both employment growth and the level of internal funds. Indeed, the coeffi-
cient on sales growth is positive and large, reflecting a strong positive relation between 
sales growth and employment growth. More importantly, however, the estimated coeffi-
cient on internal funds remains positive and significant even after controlling for sales 
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growth. Finally, in column four we include the amount of new external finance raised by 
the firm. Credit raised from traditional sources is positively related to firm growth (as ex-
pected given the findings in Tables 3 and 4), but equity raised is not related to likelihood 
of firm growth. (Recall from the descriptive statistics that small firms raise very little ex-
ternal equity.) Including the external finance variables reduces the estimated coefficient 
on internal funds slightly, but it remains positive and significant. 
At a minimum, the findings in Table 5 provide the first empirical evidence we are 
aware of on the correlation between internal finance and growth among small private 
firms. More speculatively, these findings are consistent with the finance-constrained 
model of small firm growth developed above. In particular, we find a strong positive link 
between internal funds and the likelihood of growth across small firms even after control-
ling for firm age and sales growth. The results with sales growth are especially valuable 
for interpreting the internal finance-growth relationship. If the positive relation between 
internal funds and employment growth simply reflects the fact that firms with high 
growth opportunities also have more internal funds, then including sales growth in the 
regression should substantially reduce or eliminate the positive coefficient on internal 
funds. The fact that the coefficient on internal funds remains positive, large, and signifi-
cant after controlling for sales growth is consistent with an interpretation that the growth 
of small firms is constrained by internal funds. 
As discussed above, profits is not a perfect proxy for the level of internal funds. In 
Table 6 we therefore report a set of regressions identical to those in Table 5, except that 
we replace profits with the level of internal equity (assets minus liabilities). Across all 
specifications we find a significant positive correlation between the level of internal eq-
uity and the likelihood that the firm reports positive employment growth. 
Split Sample Estimates 
Table 7 reports results from splitting the sample into “smaller” and “larger” cate-
gories. The smaller firms have fewer than 20 employees and less than $1 million in sales, 
while larger firms have at least 20 employees or at least $1 million in sales. This split into 
size categories follows Berger and Udell (1998). In general, the results in Table 7 show a 
particularly strong link between internal funds and growth among the smallest firms 
(though the estimate in column two is imprecise and just misses statistical significance at 
the 10 percent level). This finding is potentially important because larger firms are more 
profitable and are more likely to report positive employment growth (see Table 1), sug-
gesting that the growth regression is not simply capturing the fact that firms with positive 
growth over the past three years also end the period with more internal funds. Again, 
though speculative, these results are consistent with a world in which the growth of firms 
most likely to face financing frictions (very small firms) is constrained by the availability 
of internal funds. 
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Results by Year 
In Table 8, we consider whether the correlation between internal funds and 
growth differs between 1993 and 2003. First, we use the concatenated data and include an 
interaction term between internal funds and a year 2003 dummy. Second, we estimate 
separate regressions for the 1993 and 2003 sample periods. Overall, the results show a 
positive link between internal finance and growth in both 1993 and 2003. Furthermore, 
the internal finance-growth link may have weakened over time. If so, this would be con-
sistent with recent studies citing improved access to finance for small firms in recent 
years (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 2002). 
 
Results by Owner Characteristics: Race and Gender 
In Table 9, we estimate the finance-growth regression separately for minority- and 
women-owned firms. Columns one and two show a very strong relation between internal 
funds and growth for non-minority-owned firms. Columns three and four show a positive 
relation between internal finance and growth for both women- and men-owned small 
firms, though the link appears particularly strong in the sample of women-owned firms. 
Again, though these findings should be interpreted with caution, they are at least consis-
tent with minority- and women-owned firms having, on average, more limited access to 
external finance than other firms. We continue to find a significant positive correlation 
between growth and internal funds among the non-minority- and men-owned firms. 
Results by Firm Characteristics: Legal Organization and Location 
Table 10 shows separate estimates of the baseline finance-growth regression 
based on potentially important firm characteristics. In columns one and two, we split 
firms into separate categories based on whether or not the firm is legally incorporated. 
We find a positive and significant link between growth and internal funds for both incor-
porated and non-incorporated firms. However, the coefficient on internal funds is sub-
stantially larger for the non-incorporated firms. 
In columns three and four in Table 10, we split firms into “urban” and “non-
urban” groups based on their geographic location. We find positive and significant coef-
ficients on internal finance for both groups of firms, though the relation appears particu-
larly strong for firms located in non-urban areas. 
Results by Riskiness: Dun and Bradstreet Credit Score 
In Table 11, we split firms based on the Dun & Bradstreet credit score, which is 
only available in the 2003 SSBF. We find positive and significant coefficients on internal 
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finance for both “more” and “less” risky firms, though the relation appears particularly 
strong for the more risky firms. 
6. Conclusions 
We provide new evidence on small firm finance and growth using the 1993 and 2003 
Surveys of Small Business Finances. We find significant differences in the financing of 
growth and non-growth firms. In particular, we find that growth firms are more reliant 
than non-growth firms on the external finance supplied by commercial banks and finance 
companies. We also show a strong, positive relation between the level of internal funds 
and the likelihood of employment growth across small firms covered by the SSBF. The 
relation between internal finance and growth is especially strong for the smallest firms, 
firms with women owners, firms that are not incorporated, firms in non-urban locations, 
and firms with risky credit ratings. Though we are cautious in the conclusions, our find-
ings are consistent with a model of firm growth in which the growth of firms most likely 
to face financing frictions is constrained by the availability of finance. 
While this evidence would suggest that firm growth is dependent upon internal 
funds, the firm growth story may be simply a firm recovery story. The three years prior to 
1993 and 2003 were moderate recession years; therefore, when firms were asked to com-
pare sales with the previous year, the increase in sales may have been recovery from de-
creased sales, rather than growth. This analysis is constrained by the data available to dis-
tinguish between a recovery and growth story. If a community variable, such as the 
County Business Patterns sales information, could be added to the SSBF, then an ade-
quate proxy for recovery could be included in the analysis and enable the recovery and 
growth stories to be more carefully examined. Unfortunately, county locations are not 
identified in the SSBF. 
While an extensive literature exists for publicly traded firms on the relationship 
between internal financing and growth utilizing Compustat and other databases, few stud-
ies have used the SSBF or other small business databases to address this issue. This study 
has made an important contribution to the literature by recognizing that small publicly 
traded firms face similar binding internal financing constraints as non-publicly traded 
firms, even though publicly traded firms have more access to external funds. This study 
provides important information for public policymakers addressing financing constraints 
for small business owners. Most importantly, this study finds a strong, positive relation-
ship between internal funds and employment growth across small, privately held firms. In 
addition, it suggests that most severe internal funds constraints may be realized by very 
small firms and women-owned firms. These results highlight the importance of programs 
that effectively reduce the costs of borrowing (and increase net profits) in fostering the 
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growth of small businesses, especially for very small and women-owned firms. For the 
practitioner working with small businesses, this study suggests that while outside capital 
is often needed, internal capital is critically important for the growth of small businesses. 
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8. Tables 
Table 1. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
The sample is constructed from the 1993 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances. The sample ex-
cludes publicly traded firms and firms located in SIC 49 (utilities), SIC 60-69 (finance, insurance and real 
estate), and SIC 91-98 (public administration). “Smaller” firms have fewer than 20 employees and less than 
$1 million in sales. Firms must report positive, zero or negative employment growth since 1990 for the 
1993 sample and since 2000 for the 2003 sample, meaning firms in business three years or less are ex-
cluded from the sample. All values are in 2003 dollars. 
 
  
  1993 2003 Pooled 
Size Category: Smaller Larger All Smaller Larger All Smaller Larger All 
           
Employ-
ees mean 3.009 33.486 8.291 3.289 30.660 8.912 3.156 31.856 8.623 
 median 2 20 3 2 18 3 2 18 3 
           
Sales mean 254592 5376137 1142314 228883 4829399 1174054 241089 5060659 1159297 
 median 172380 2354735 229840 140000 2000000 217000 151000 2165093 224094 
           
Age mean 14.487 18.852 15.243 15.928 18.278 16.411 15.244 18.521 15.868 
 median 12 15 12 14 16 14 13 15 13 
           
Profits mean 32725 218209 64876 46344 627286 165698 39878 454254 118823 
 median 17238 77080 21064 19000 121000 24535 18000 100795 22984 
           
Em-
ployment mean 0.287 0.474 0.319 0.187 0.471 0.246 0.235 0.472 0.280 
Growth median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
           
Sales mean 0.566 0.692 0.588 0.453 0.654 0.494 0.506 0.670 0.537 
Growth median 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
           
Tradi-
tional mean 29663 548816 119648 55284 633979 174176 43119 597957 148825 
Credit median 1149 76691 3677 500 93430 6000 919 86000 4660 
           
Equity mean 8081 72253 19204 1368 17141 4608 4555 40452 11394 
Raised median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 2. Growth Statistics by Size, Age, and Industry 
Table 2 reports average employment growth for firms in different size, age and industry groupings. The 
sample is described in Table 1. Employment growth is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm reports 
positive employment growth over the prior three years, and zero otherwise. 
  
 Pooled 1993 2003 
Category Avg. Employ-ment Growth n 
Avg. Employ-
ment Growth n 
Avg. Employ-
ment Growth n 
Any Firm 0.280 7352 0.319 3905 0.246 3447 
Number of Employees       
0-1 0.099 1737 0.157 1000 0.036 737 
2-4 0.279 1443 0.352 770 0.219 673 
5-9 0.403 999 0.442 545 0.371 454 
10-19 0.439 654 0.478 338 0.413 316 
20-99 0.549 1775 0.524 872 0.567 903 
100 or more 0.628 744 0.696 380 0.574 364 
       
Total Sales       
Less than 25,000 0.118 559 0.223 264 0.046 295 
25,000-49,999 0.135 454 0.186 233 0.098 221 
50,000-99,999 0.177 616 0.272 357 0.086 259 
100,000-249,999 0.257 1158 0.300 691 0.210 467 
250,000-499,999 0.299 859 0.312 497 0.287 362 
500,000-999,999 0.379 777 0.391 404 0.370 373 
1 million-2,499,999 0.420 922 0.440 470 0.407 452 
2,500,000-4,999,999 0.498 608 0.461 323 0.529 285 
5 million-9,999,999 0.518 577 0.498 283 0.533 294 
10 million or more 0.565 822 0.569 383 0.561 439 
Age       
Less than 4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
4-9 0.341 2326 0.374 1404 0.306 922 
10-19 0.268 2593 0.300 1404 0.239 1189 
20 or more 0.221 2433 0.264 1097 0.193 1336 
       
Industry       
Mining/Construction 0.290 906 0.320 515 0.258 391 
Manufacturing 0.309 962 0.393 518 0.228 444 
Transportation 0.352 284 0.428 144 0.304 140 
Wholesale Trade 0.349 642 0.412 388 0.272 254 
Retail Trade 0.265 1600 0.261 910 0.270 690 
Services 0.262 2958 0.310 1430 0.228 1528 
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Table 3. Characteristics of Growth Firms 
Table 3 reports key characteristics of growth and non-growth firms for the sample described in Table 1. 
Firms are considered growth firms if they report positive employment growth over the prior three years, 
and non-growth firms otherwise. All values are in 2003 dollars. 
  
Category All Firms Growth Firms 
Non-Growth 
Firms 
Difference 
p-value 
Employees mean 8.623 15.430 5.977 0.000 
 median 3 6 2  
Sales mean 1159297 2056466 810469 0.000 
 median 224094 453865 172380  
Age mean 15.868 14.182 16.524 0.000 
 median 13 11 14  
Profits mean 118823 210010 83369 0.007 
 median 22984 34476 20000  
Traditional Credit (Total) mean 148825 269235 102008 0.000 
 median 4660 17238 1007  
Commercial Bank Credit mean 89407 162484 60994 0.000 
 median 0 0 0  
Finance Company Credit mean 27218 50582 18134 0.019 
 median 0 0 0  
Share with Line of Credit  0.313 0.410 0.276 0.000 
Share with Mortgage Loan  0.097 0.106 0.094 0.108 
Share with Motor Vehicle Loan  0.266 0.325 0.243 0.000 
Share with Capital Lease  0.093 0.141 0.074 0.000 
Share with Equipment Loan  0.132 0.188 0.110 0.000 
Share with Other Traditional Loan  0.105 0.135 0.094 0.000 
Share with Any Traditional Loan  0.595 0.710 0.551 0.000 
Share with Commercial Bank Loans  0.415 0.525 0.372 0.000 
Share with S&L Loans  0.047 0.057 0.043 0.012 
Share with Credit Union Loans  0.029 0.034 0.026 0.077 
Share with Any Depository Credit  0.461 0.572 0.418 0.000 
Share with Finance Company Credit  0.182 0.240 0.159 0.000 
Share with Brokerage or Mutual Fund 
Credit  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.717 
Share with Leasing Company Credit  0.063 0.088 0.053 0.000 
Share with Insurance or Mortgage 
Company Credit  0.015 0.014 0.015 0.911 
Share with Any Non-Depository 
Credit  0.241 0.313 0.213 0.000 
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Table 4. Likelihood of Growth Firms Using Credit, by Source and Type 
Table 4 reports estimates from logistic regressions that examine how the likelihood of obtaining different 
types and sources of external credit differs across growth and non-growth firms after controlling for key 
firm and owner characteristics. The table reports coefficient estimates on a dummy variable equal to one if 
the firm reports positive employment growth over the prior three years, and zero otherwise. The sample is 
described in Table 1. Robust standard errors are in italics. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels. 
  
Type or Source of Credit Coefficient on Growth Dummy 
Robust Standard 
Error 
Log  
Likelihood 
    
Line of Credit 0.196 0. 082** -3905.07 
Mortgage Loan -0.010 0.121 -2230.40 
Motor Vehicle Loan 0.154 0.081* -3997.47 
Capital Lease 0.297 0.118** -2060.34 
Equipment Loan 0.226 0.103** -2606.07 
Other Traditional Loan 0.157 0.115 -2376.53 
Any Traditional Loan 0.253 0.082*** -4339.09 
    
Commercial Bank Loan 0.212 0.077*** -4363.77 
S&L Loan 0.200 0.168 -1358.22 
Credit Union Loan 0.258 0.212 -926.737 
Any Depository Credit 0.233 0.077*** -4456.50 
    
Finance Company Credit 0.245 0.097** -3188.47 
Brokerage or Mutual Fund Credit -0469 0.433 -233.97 
Leasing Company Credit 0.052 0.132 -1569.86 
Insurance or Mortgage Company Credit -0.044 0.377 -535.25 
Any Non-Depository Credit 0.156 0.086* -3730.74 
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Table 5. Internal Finance and Growth – Pooled Regression Results 
Table 5 reports logistic regressions showing the correlation between internal finance and the likelihood of 
growth across firms. The sample is described in Table 1. The variable “PositiveGrowth” takes the value of 
one if the firm reports positive employment growth (since 1990 for the 1993 SSBF; since 2000 for the 2003 
SSBF) and zero otherwise. InternalFunds is the natural log of net profits as described in the paper. Age is 
the natural log of firm age. Sales growth takes the value of one if the firm reports positive sales growth 
(since 1990 for the 1993 SSBF; since 2000 for the 2003 SSBF) and zero otherwise. CreditRaised is the 
natural log of total borrowing from traditional sources. EquityRaised is the natural log of new external eq-
uity raised. Industry and year fixed effects are included in each specification. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: (PositiveGrowth)j 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(InternalFunds) j 5.501 6.037 4.876 4.124 
 (1.157)*** (1.553)*** (1.309)*** (1.190)*** 
(Age)j  -0.457 -0.329 -0.335 
  (0.059)*** (0.061)*** (0.062)*** 
(SalesGwth)j   1.177 1.133 
   (0.078)*** (0.079)*** 
(CreditRaised) j    0.059 
    (0.007)*** 
(EquityRaised) j    -0.004 
    (0.011) 
     
Industry Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Effects yes yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood -4298.81 -4245.18 -3962.28 -3897.29 
Observations 7352 7352 7230 7230 
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 Table 6. Internal Equity and Growth – Pooled Regression Results 
Table 6 reports logistic regressions showing the correlation between internal equity and the likelihood of 
growth across firms. The sample is described in Table 1. The variable “PositiveGrowth” takes the value of 
one if the firm reports positive employment growth (since 1990 for the 1993 SSBF; since 2000 for the 2003 
SSBF) and zero otherwise. InternalEquity is the natural log of firm equity (total assets minus total liabili-
ties). Age is the natural log of firm age. Sales growth takes the value of one if the firm reports positive sales 
growth (since 1990 for the 1993 SSBF; since 2000 for the 2003 SSBF) and zero otherwise. CreditRaised is 
the natural log of total borrowing from traditional sources. EquityRaised is the natural log of new external 
equity raised. Industry and year fixed effects are included in each specification. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: (PositiveGrowth)j 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(InternalEquity) j 2.485 3.534 2.818 1.899 
 (1.261)** (1.374)*** (1.399)** (1.362)*** 
(Age)j  -0.466 -0.334 -0.335 
  (0.059)*** (0.061)*** (0.063)*** 
(SalesGwth)j   1.184 1.142 
   (0.078)*** (0.079)*** 
(CreditRaised) j    0.060 
    (0.007)*** 
(EquityRaised) j    -0.004 
    (0.011) 
     
Industry Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Effects yes yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood -4312.43 -4255.21 -3970.05 -3905.85 
Observations 7352 7352 7230 7230 
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Table 7. Internal Finance and Growth – Regression Results by Firm Size 
Table 7 examines whether the correlation between internal finance and the likelihood of growth differs 
across firms in different size classes. The sample is described in Table 1. “Smaller” firms have fewer than 
20 employees and less than $1 million in sales. “Larger” firms have at least 20 employees or at least $1 
million in sales. The variable “PositiveGrowth” takes the value of one if the firm reports positive employ-
ment growth (since 1990 for the 1993 SSBF; since 2000 for the 2003 SSBF) and zero otherwise. Internal-
Funds is the natural log of net profits. Age is the natural log of firm age. Sales growth takes the value of 
one if the firm reports positive sales growth (since 1990 for the 1993 SSBF; since 2000 for the 2003 SSBF) 
and zero otherwise. CreditRaised is the natural log of total borrowing from traditional sources. Eq-
uityRaised is the natural log of new external equity raised. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: (PositiveGrowth)j 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm Size Smaller Larger 
(InternalFunds) j 21.847 13.898 1.291 1.005 
 (9.128)**  (8.569) (0.614)** (0.582)* 
(Age)j -0.599 -0.463 -0.451 -0.351 
 (0.076)*** (0.078)*** (0.101)*** (0.109)*** 
(SalesGwth)j  0.913  1.533 
  (0.093)***  (0.144)*** 
(CreditRaised) j  0.045  0.034 
  (0.009)***  (0.013)*** 
(EquityRaised) j  -0.005  -0.012 
  (0.013)  (0.017) 
     
Industry Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Effects yes yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood -2207.00 -2074.08 -2130.31 -1921.93 
Observations 4207 4123 3145 3107 
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Table 8. Internal Finance and Growth – Regression Results by Year 
Table 8 reports logistic regressions showing the correlation between internal finance and the likelihood of 
growth across firms separately for the 1993 and 2003 sample years. The sample is described in Table 1. 
The variable “PositiveGrowth” takes the value of one if the firm reports positive employment growth (since 
1990 for the 1993 SSBF; since 2000 for the 2003 SSBF) and zero otherwise. InternalFunds is the natural 
log of net profits. Age is the natural log of firm age. Sales growth takes the value of one if the firm reports 
positive sales growth (since 1990 for the 1993 SSBF; since 2000 for the 2003 SSBF) and zero otherwise. 
CreditRaised is the natural log of total borrowing from traditional sources. EquityRaised is the natural log 
of new external equity raised. IF*2003 is the interaction between InternalFunds and a year 2003 dummy 
variable. Industry and year fixed effects are included in each specification. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
  Dependent Variable: (PositiveGrowth)j 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample Pooled 1993 2003 
(InternalFunds) j 42.900 32.696 3.591 
 (17.069)** (15.518)** (1.133)*** 
(Age)j  -0.326 -0.356 
  (0.078)*** (0.100)*** 
(SalesGwth)j  0.722 1.557 
  (0.098)*** (0.129)*** 
(CreditRaised) j  0.039 0.081 
  (0.009)*** (0.011)*** 
(EquityRaised) j  -0.005 0.007 
  (0.011) (0.025) 
(IF*2003)j -37.513   
 (17.128)**   
    
Industry Effects yes yes yes 
Year Effects yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood -4296.70 -2261.80 -1647.77 
Observations 7352 3788 3442 
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Table 9. Internal Finance and Growth – Regression Results by Owner 
Characteristics 
Table 9 examines whether the correlation between internal finance and the likelihood of growth differs by 
characteristics of firm owners. The sample is described in Table 1. The variable “PositiveGrowth” takes the 
value of one if the firm reports positive employment growth (since 1990 for the 1993 SSBF; since 2000 for 
the 2003 SSBF) and zero otherwise. InternalFunds is the natural log of net profits. Age is the natural log of 
firm age. Sales growth takes the value of one if the firm reports positive sales growth (since 1990 for the 
1993 SSBF; since 2000 for the 2003 SSBF) and zero otherwise. CreditRaised is the natural log of total bor-
rowing from traditional sources. EquityRaised is the natural log of new external equity raised. Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: (PositiveGrowth)j 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Owner Characteristic Minority Not Minority Women Men 
(InternalFunds) j 7.229 3.983 7.550 3.698 
 (4.423) (1.206)***  (4.404)* (1.166)*** 
(Age)j -0.178 -0.346 -0.376 -0.337 
 (0.191) (0.066)*** (0.154)** (0.069)*** 
(SalesGwth)j 1.346 1.120 1.137 1.137 
 (0.253)*** (0.083)*** (0.175)*** (0.089)*** 
(CreditRaised) j 0.044 0.060 0.048 0.061 
 (0.021)** (0.007)*** (0.015)*** (0.008)*** 
(EquityRaised) j 0.054 -0.008 -0.020 -0.001 
 (0.027)** (0.011) (0.026) (0.012) 
     
Industry Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Effects yes yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood -472.54 -3411.15 -704.26 -3193.84 
Observations 905 6323 1401 5829 
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Table 10. Internal Finance and Growth – Regression Results by Firm 
Characteristics 
Table 10 examines whether the correlation between internal finance and the likelihood of growth differs by 
characteristics of the firm. The sample is described in Table 1. The variable “PositiveGrowth” takes the 
value of one if the firm reports positive employment growth (since 1990 for the 1993 SSBF; since 2000 for 
the 2003 SSBF) and zero otherwise. InternalFunds is the natural log of net profits. Age is the natural log of 
firm age. Sales growth takes the value of one if the firm reports positive sales growth (since 1990 for the 
1993 SSBF; since 2000 for the 2003 SSBF) and zero otherwise. CreditRaised is the natural log of total bor-
rowing from traditional sources. EquityRaised is the natural log of new external equity raised. Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
 
 Dependent Variable: (PositiveGrowth)j 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm Characteristic Incorporated Not Incorporated Urban Not Urban 
(InternalFunds) j 1.362 17.294 3.406 12.292 
 (0.652)** (4.336)***  (1.096)*** (5.949)** 
(Age)j -0.282 -0.443 -0.387 -0.161 
 (0.081)*** (0.101)*** (0.071)*** (0.127) 
(SalesGwth)j 1.312 0.852 1.174 0.974 
 (0.104)*** (0.123)*** (0.090)*** (0.167)*** 
(CreditRaised) j 0.050 0.051 0.061 0.054 
 (0.009)*** (0.011)*** (0.008)*** (0.015)*** 
(EquityRaised) j -0.000 -0.018 0.007 -0.050 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.026)* 
     
Industry Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Effects yes yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood -2634.87 -1287.77 -3063.50 -820.792 
Observations 4484 2746 5703 1527 
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Table 11. Internal Finance and Growth – Regression Results by Dun & Bradstreet 
Credit Score (2003 only) 
Table 11 examines whether the correlation between internal finance and the likelihood of growth differs by 
the DB credit score. The sample is described in Table 1. The variable “PositiveGrowth” takes the value of 
one if the firm reports positive employment growth (since 1990 for the 1993 SSBF; since 2000 for the 2003 
SSBF) and zero otherwise. InternalFunds is the natural log of net profits. Age is the natural log of firm age. 
Sales growth takes the value of one if the firm reports positive sales growth (since 1990 for the 1993 SSBF; 
since 2000 for the 2003 SSBF) and zero otherwise. CreditRaised is the natural log of total borrowing from 
traditional sources. EquityRaised is the natural log of new external equity raised. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: (PositiveGrowth)j 
 (1) (2) 
Firm Type DB More Risky DB Less Risky 
(InternalFunds) j 6.197 2.456 
 (2.361)*** (1.097)**  
(Age)j -0.457 -0.325 
 (0.167)*** (0.125)*** 
(SalesGwth)j 1.380 1.675 
 (0.215)*** (0.159)*** 
(CreditRaised) j 0.085 0.076 
 (0.018)*** (0.014)*** 
(EquityRaised) j 0.005 0.023 
 (0.041) (0.029) 
   
Industry Effects yes yes 
Year Effects n/a n/a 
Log Likelihood -553.61 -1084.61 
Observations 1197 2231 
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